Nova NASA 8 F-1 - Credit: © Mark Wade. 1,685 bytes. 64 x 441 pixels.

Most capable Nova studied just prior to selection of Saturn for moon landing. Used a three stage configuration of eight F-1 engines in stage 1, two M-1 engines in stage 2, and one J-2 engine in stage 3. Similar to the Saturn C-8 except in the use of M-1 engines. Unlike other modular Nova designs of the time, this one had the unitary stage construction of Saturn.

LEO Payload: 181,000 kg. to: 160 km Orbit. at: 0.0 degrees. Payload: 68,000 kg. to a: translunar trajectory. Liftoff Thrust: 5,504,850 kgf. Total Mass: 4,752,200 kg. Core Diameter: 17.4 m. Total Length: 128.0 m.

• Stage Number: 1. 1 x Nova 60-8-1 Gross Mass: 3,628,000 kg. Empty Mass: 227,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 6,315,000 kgf. Isp: 304 sec. Burn time: 161 sec. Isp(sl): 265 sec. Diameter: 17.4 m. Span: 18.0 m. Length: 41.2 m. Propellants: Lox/Kerosene No Engines: 8. F-1

• Stage Number: 2. 1 x Nova 60-8-2 Gross Mass: 680,000 kg. Empty Mass: 54,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 1,088,000 kgf. Isp: 428 sec. Burn time: 242 sec. Isp(sl): 310 sec. Diameter: 11.6 m. Span: 11.6 m. Length: 35.1 m. Propellants: Lox/LH2 No Engines: 2. M-1

• Stage Number: 3. 1 x Nova 60-8-3 Gross Mass: 227,000 kg. Empty Mass: 23,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 91,000 kgf. Isp: 425 sec. Burn time: 941 sec. Isp(sl): 306 sec. Diameter: 6.7 m. Span: 6.7 m. Length: 30.5 m. Propellants: Lox/LH2 No Engines: 1. J-2

• Ad Hoc Task Group for a Manned Lunar Landing Study

  NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., established the Ad Hoc Task Group for a Manned Lunar Landing Study, to be chaired by William A. Fleming of NASA Headquarters. The study was expected to produce the following information:

  • All tasks associated with the mission.
  • Interdependent time-phasing of the tasks.
  • Areas requiring considerable technological advancements from the current state of the art.
  • Tasks for which multiple approach solutions were advisable.
  • Important action and decision points in the mission plan.
  • A refined estimate by task and by fiscal year of the dollar resources required for the mission.
  • Refined estimates of in-house manpower requirements, by task and by fiscal year
  • Tentative in-house and contractor task assignments accompanying the dollar and manpower resource requirements.
  The study began on May 8 and the final report was submitted on June 16. Guidelines served as a starting point for the study:
  • The manned lunar landing target date was 1967.
  • Intermediate missions of multiman orbital satellites and manned circumlunar missions were desirable at the earliest possible time.
  • Man's mission on the moon as it affected the study was to be determined by the Ad Hoc Task Group - i.e., the time to be spent on the lunar surface and the tasks to be performed while there.
  • In establishing the mission plan, the use of the Saturn C-2 launch vehicle was to be evaluated as compared with an alternative launch vehicle having a higher thrust first stage and C-2 upper-stage components.
  • The mission plan was to include parallel development of liquid and solid propulsion leading to a Nova vehicle 400,000 pounds in earth orbit and should indicate when the decision should be made on the final Nova configuration.
  • Nuclear-powered launch vehicles should not be considered for use in the first manned lunar landing mission.
  • The flight test program should be laid out with enough launchings to meet the needs of the program considering the reliability requirements.
  • Alternative approaches should be provided in critical areas - e.g., upper stages and mission modes.

  The engineering sketch drawn by John D. Bird of Langley Research Center on May 3, 1961, indicated the thinking of that period: By launching two Saturn C-2's, the lunar landing mission could be accomplished by using both earth rendezvous and lunar rendezvous at various stages of the mission.

• Saturn C-2 discontinued

  NASA announced that further engineering design work on the Saturn C-2 configuration would be discontinued and that effort instead would be redirected toward clarification of the Saturn C-3 and Nova concepts. Investigations were specifically directed toward determining capabilities of the proposed C-3 configuration in supporting the Apollo mission.

• NASA / DOD agree to define support requirements

  NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., requested Kurt H. Debus, Director of the NASA Launch Operations Directorate, and Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, Commander of the Air Force Missile Test Center, to make a joint analysis of all major factors regarding the launch requirements, methods, and procedures needed in support of an early manned lunar landing. The schedules and early requirements were to be considered in two phases:

  1. in line with the Fleming Report, a direct flight to the moon would be assumed, using the Saturn C-1 and C-3 launch vehicles in early support phases and liquid- or solid-fueled Nova launch vehicles for the lunar landing;
  2. as a possible alternative or parallel program, orbital rendezvous operations using Saturn C-3 and liquid-fueled Nova.
  The analysis should include recommendations on mutual NASA-DOD range responsibilities, authority, management structures, and other allied subjects. On June 30, Seamans notified Debus and Davis that the evaluation of tracking and command stations should not be included in the study. He stressed that the factors of immediate concern with regard to launch operations were those of launch site locations, land acquisition requirements, spacecraft and launch vehicle preparation facilities, vehicle launch facilities, and other facilities and requirements at the launch site. (Phase I of the Report was submitted on July 31.)

• Manned Lunar Landing Coordination Group

  At NASA Headquarters, the first meeting was held of the Manned Lunar Landing Coordination Group, attended by NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Ira H. Abbott, Don R. Ostrander, Charles H. Roadman, William A. Fleming, DeMarquis D. Wyatt (part-time), and George M. Low (in place of Abe Silverstein). This Headquarters Group, appointed by Seamans, was to coordinate problems that jointly affected several NASA Offices, during the interim period while the manned space flight organization was being formed. Members of the steering group included NASA program directors, with participation by Wernher von Braun of Marshall Space Flight Center, Robert R. Gilruth of STG, and Wyatt and Abraham Hyatt of NASA Headquarters, as required. Fleming acted as Secretary of the Group. A list of decisions and actions required to implement an accelerated lunar landing program was drawn up as a tentative agenda for the next meeting:

  • Begin Nova systems integration studies and develop the general arrangement of second and third stages. The studies should include spacecraft propulsion stages and spacecraft.
  • Begin Saturn C-3 systems integration studies.
  • Begin developing Nova and C-3 first-stage specifications in preparation to letting contracts
  • Continue Launch Operations Directorate-Air Force Missile Test Center studies of Nova and C-3 launch sites at Atlantic Missile Range (AMR).
  • Take steps to bring the contractor aboard as soon as possible for Nova and C-3 launch facility and test stand designs.
  • Accelerate F-1 engine funding to provide adequate production engines for the Nova and C-3.
  • Examine the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) proposal for static test facilities for large vehicle stages with a view toward beginning detailed site examination.
  • Accelerate funding of the J-2 engine to provide acceptance test stands.
  • Determine the necessity for a one-million-pound-thrust liquid- hydrogen - liquid-oxygen engine.
  • Begin design studies on spacecraft propulsion systems and develop specifications. Define management responsibilities.
  • Begin preparations for letting the contract for a spacecraft operations facility at AMR.
  • Determine the relationships and responsibilities of MSFC and STG on guidance and control.

• NASA-DOD report on launch sites for Apollo

  Phase I of a joint NASA-DOD report on facilities and resources required at launch sites to support the manned lunar landing program was submitted to Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., by Kurt H. Debus, Director, Launch Operations Directorate, and Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, Commander of the Air Force Missile Test Center. The report, requested by Seamans on June 23, was based on the use of Nova- class launch vehicles for the manned lunar landing in a direct ascent mode, with the Saturn C-3 in supporting missions. Eight launch sites were considered: Cape Canaveral (on-shore); Cape Canaveral (off- shore); Mayaguana Island (Atlantic Missile Range downrange); Cumberland Island, Ga.; Brownsville, Tex.; White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex.; Christmas Island, Pacific Ocean; and South Point, Hawaii. On the basis of minimum cost and use of existing national resources, and taking into consideration the stringent time schedule, White Sands Missile Range and Cape Canaveral (on-shore) were favored. White Sands presented serious limitations on launch azimuths because of first-stage impact hazards on populated areas.

• Improved Mercury proposed for lunar landing Spacecraft: Gemini LOR.

  James A. Chamberlin and James T. Rose of STG proposed adapting the improved Mercury spacecraft to a 35,000-pound payload, including a 5,000-pound "lunar lander." This payload would be launched by a Saturn C-3 in the lunar orbit rendezvous mode. The proposal was in direct competition with the Apollo proposals that favored direct landing on the moon and involved a 150,000-pound payload launched by a Nova-class vehicle with approximately 12 million pounds of thrust.

• Merritt Island selected for Saturn V launch site.

  After considering Cape Canaveral, Cape Canaveral-Merritt Island, Mayaguana-Bahamas, Cumberland-Georgia, Brownville-Texas, Christmas Island, Hawaii, and White Sands, Merritt Island selected as launch site for manned lunar flights and other missions requiring Saturn and Nova class vehicles. Based upon national space goals announced by the President in May, NASA plans called for acquisition of 80,000 acres north and west of AFMTC, to be administered by the USAF as agent for NASA and as a part of the Atlantic Missile Range. Additional Details: Merritt Island selected for Saturn V launch site..

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  Nova Concepts - NASA Credit: © Mark Wade. 13,422 bytes. 640 x 349 pixels.

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• STG discussed development of automatic checkout system for the entire NASA launch vehicle program

  The MSFC-STG Advanced Program Coordination Board met at STG and discussed the question of the development of an automatic checkout system which would include the entire launch vehicle program from the Saturn C-1 through the Nova. It agreed that the Apollo contractor should be instructed to make the spacecraft electrical subsystems compatible with the Saturn complex.

  In further discussion, Paul J. DeFries of Marshall Space Flight Center MSFC presented a list of proposed guidelines for use in studying early manned lunar landing missions:

  • The crew should draw on its own resources only when absolutely necessary. Equipment and service personnel external to the spacecraft should be used as much as possible.
  • Early lunar expeditions would receive active external support only up to the time of the launch from earth orbit.
  • The crew would board the spacecraft only after it was checked out and ready for final countdown and launch.
  • The first Apollo crews should have an emergency shelter available on the moon which could afford several months of lift: support and protection.
  • The capability for clocking an orbital launch vehicle with a propulsion stage - the "connecting mode" - should be possible.
  • The capability of fueling an orbital launch vehicle should be made available - "fueling mode."
  • The capability of making repairs, replacements, or adjustments in orbit should be developed.
  • For repairs, replacements, and adjustments on the orbital launch vehicle in earth orbit, two support vehicles would be necessary. These would be a Saturn C-1 launch vehicle manned by Apollo technicians and an unmanned Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle carrying repair kits.
  • Development of docking, testing of components, and techniques for docking and training of man in orbital operations could be carried out by a space ferry loaded with a Mercury capsule.
  Some of the points discussed in connection with these suggestions were:
  • Orbital launch operations were just as complex, if not more complex, than earth-launched operations.
  • A question existed as to how complex the orbital launch facility could be and what its function should be.
  • There was a possibility that the crew could do most of the checkout and launch operations. Studies should be made to define the role of the crew versus the role of a proposed MSFC auxiliary checkout and maintenance crew.
  After the discussion on orbital launch operations, the Board agreed that contemporary technology was inadequate to support such operations. Both STG and MSFC would need to study and develop both refueling and connector techniques.

• Saturn static test stand site selected.

  NASA selected Pearl River site in southwestern Mississippi, 35 miles from Michoud plant in New Orleans, for static test facility for Saturn and Nova-class vehicles, completed facility to operate under direction of Marshall Space Flight Center.

• Working group on large launch vehicles

  In a memorandum to D. Brainerd Holmes, Director, Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), Milton W. Rosen, Director of Launch Vehicles and Propulsion, OMSF, described the organization of a working group to recommend to the Director a large launch vehicle program which would meet the requirements of manned space flight and which would have broad and continuing national utility for other NASA and DOD programs. The group would include members from the NASA Office of Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (Rosen, Chairman, Richard B. Canright, Eldon W. Hall, Elliott Mitchell, Norman Rafel, Melvyn Savage, and Adelbert O. Tischler); from the Marshall Space Flight Center (William A. Mrazek, Hans H. Maus, and James B. Bramlet); and from the NASA Office of Spacecraft and Flight Missions (John H. Disher). (David M. Hammock of MSC was later added to the group.) The principal background material to be used by the group would consist of reports of the Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (Golovin Committee), the Fleming Committee, the Lundin Committee, the Heaton Committee, and the Debus-Davis Committee. Some of the subjects the group would be considering were:

  1. an assessment of the problems involved in orbital rendezvous,
  2. an evaluation of intermediate vehicles (Saturn C-3, C-4, and C-5),
  3. an evaluation of Nova-class vehicles,
  4. an assessment of the future course of large solid-fuel rocket motor development,
  5. an evaluation of the utility of the Titan III for NASA missions, and
  6. an evaluation of the realism of the spacecraft development program (schedules, weights, performances).
  Rosen set November 20 as a target date for a recommended program.

• Saturn C-5 launch vehicle configuration selected

  Rosen Committee studies in November and December indicated that the most flexible choice for Apollo was the Saturn C-4, with two required for the earth orbit rendezvous approach or one for the lunar orbit rendezvous mission, with a smaller landed payload. The panel rejected solid motors again, but Rosen himself still pushed for Nova. An extra F-1 engine was 'slid in' for insurance, resulting in the Saturn C-5 configuration. The Manned Space Flight Management Council decided at its first meeting that the Saturn C-5 launch vehicle would have a first stage configuration of five F-1 engines and a second stage configuration of five J-2 engines. The third stage would be the S-IVB with one J-2 engine. It recommended that the contractor for stage integration of the Saturn C-1 be Chrysler Corporation and that the contractor for stage integration of the Saturn C-5 be The Boeing Company. Contractor work on the Saturn C-5 should proceed immediately to provide a complete design study and a detailed development plan before letting final contracts and assigning large numbers of contractor personnel to Marshall Space Flight Center or Michoud.

• Manned Space Flight Management Council meeting

  The preparation of schedules based on the NASA Fiscal Year 1962 budget (including the proposed supplemental appropriation), the Fiscal Year 1963 budget as submitted to Congress, and Fiscal Year 1964 and subsequent funding was discussed at the Manned Space Flight Management Council meeting. Program assumptions as presented by Wernher von Braun, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), were approved for use in preparation of the schedules :

  • The Saturn C-5 launch vehicle and earth orbital rendezvous were considered the primary mode for the lunar landing.
  • Full-scale orbit operations development, including ground testing, would be accomplished, using S-I boosters and orbital upper stages. This development would be planned so that upper stages and rendezvous techniques would be developed by the time the C-5 was operational. Planning would consider both connecting and fueling modes.
  • The development of a two-stage Nova with liquid-propellant engines in both stages would be activated as early as realistically feasible. This would provide an alternative, direct flight mode carrying the same orbital launch vehicle as developed for the C-5.
  • There would be no solid-propellant vehicle development.
  Charles W. Frick of MSC and Hans H. Maus of MSFC would coordinate schedule assumptions between the Centers.

• Delay in award of a Nova launch vehicle study contract

  The Manned Space Flight Management Council decided to delay the awarding of a Nova launch vehicle study contract until July 1 at the earliest to allow time for an in-house study of bids submitted and for further examination of the schedule for a manned lunar landing using the direct ascent technique.

• Apollo lunar landing mode component schedules and cost breakdowns prepared

  D. Brainerd Holmes, NASA's Director of Manned Space Flight, requested the Directors of Launch Operations Center, Manned Spacecraft Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to prepare supporting component schedules and cost breakdowns through Fiscal Year 1967 for each of the proposed lunar landing modes: earth orbit rendezvous, lunar orbit rendezvous, and direct ascent. For direct ascent, a Saturn C-8 launch vehicle was planned, using a configuration of eight F-1 engines, eight J-2 engines, and one J-2 engine. MSFC was also requested to submit a proposed schedule and summary of costs for the Nova launch vehicle, using the configuration of eight F-1 engines, two M-1 engines, and one J-2 engine. Each Center was asked to make an evaluation of the schedules as to possibilities of achievement, major problem areas, and recommendations for deviations.

• Lunar orbit rendezvous selected as mode for the Apollo lunar landing mission

  After an extended discussion, the Manned Space Flight Management Council unanimously decided:

  • Lunar orbit rendezvous, using the Saturn C-5 launch vehicle, should be the mission mode for lunar exploration.
  • The development of a lunar logistics vehicle, using the Saturn C-1B or the C-5 launch vehicle, should be started and a six-month study of this development should begin immediately.
  • Time was too short and the expense too great to develop a parallel backup mode.
  • Study of the Nova vehicle should continue with the expectation that its development would follow the C-5 by two or three years.
  • The C-1B launch vehicle should be started immediately, looking toward the first two-stage flight in mid- 1965.
  • Development of a lunar excursion module should begin at once.
  These decisions were to be presented to NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden, and NASA Administrator James E. Webb for approval.

• Selection of LOR as Apollo Mission Mode

  Following a long controversy NASA selected Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR) as the fastest, cheapest, and safest mode to accomplish the Apollo mission. LOR solved the engineering problem of how to land. The EOR or Direct Landing approaches required the Apollo crew to be on their backs during the landing and having to use television or mirrors to see the lunar surface. A lunar crasher stage approach had finally emerged as lesser of evils but raised other issues. LOR allowed a purpose-built lander with a logical helicopter-like crew station layout. Studies indicated LOR would allow landing 6-8 months earlier and cost $9.2 billion vs $ 10.6 billion for EOR or direct. Direct flight by this time would not involve Nova, but a scaled-down two-man spacecraft that could be launched by the Saturn C-5. Additional Details: Selection of LOR as Apollo Mission Mode.

• Conclusions on the selection of a lunar mission mode based on studies conducted in 1961 and 1962 Spacecraft: Apollo LM.

  The Office of Systems under NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight summarized its conclusions on the selection of a lunar mission mode based on NASA and industry studies conducted in 1961 and 1962:

  • There were no significant technical problems which would preclude the acceptance of any of the modes, if sufficient time and money were available. (The modes considered were the C-5 direct ascent, C-5 earth orbit rendezvous (EOR), C-5 lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR), Nova direct ascent, and solid-fuel Nova direct ascent.)
  • The C-5 direct ascent technique was characterized by high development risk and the least flexibility for further development.
  • The C-5 EOR mode had the lowest probability of mission success and the greatest development complexity.
  • The Nova direct ascent method would require the development of larger launch vehicles than the C-5. However, it would be the least complex from an operational and subsystem standpoint and had greater crew safety and initial mission capabilities than did LOR.
  • The solid-fuel Nova direct flight mode would necessitate a launch vehicle development parallel to the C-5. Such a development could not be financed under current budget allotments.
  • Only the LOR and EOR modes would make full use of the development of the C-5 launch vehicle and the command and service modules. Based on technical considerations, the LOR mode was distinctly preferable.
  • The Directors of MSC and Marshall Space Flight Center had both expressed strong preference for the LOR mode.
  On the basis of these conclusions, the LOR mode was recommended as most suitable for the manned lunar landing mission. (The studies summarized in this document were used by the Manned Space Flight Management Council in their mission mode decision on June 22.)

• 215 - Scala, Keith J, and Swanson, Glen E, Quest, "They Might Be Giants Part 1", Fall, 1992.