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LM on Moon View 2 Credit: NASA. 43,005 bytes. 500 x 453 pixels. |
Following the decision to use the lunar orbit rendezvous method to get to the moon, Grumman received the contract to develop the lunar module, which would take the first men to the surface to the moon. If funding had been available, modified lunar modules would have been used to set up the first lunar bases.
Unit Price $ : 50.00 million. Craft.Crew Size: 2. Total Length: 6.4 m. Maximum Diameter: 4.3 m. Total Habitable Volume: 6.65 m3. Total Mass: 14,696 kg. Total Propellants: 10,523 kg. Primary Engine Thrust: 4,491 kgf. Main Engine Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. Main Engine Isp: 311 sec. Total spacecraft delta v: 4,700 m/s. Electric System: 50.00 total kWh. Electrical System: Batteries.
Several possible configurations for a manned lunar landing by direct ascent being studied at the Lewis Research Center were described to the Research Steering Committee by Seymour C. Himmel. A six-stage launch vehicle would be required, the first three stages to boost the spacecraft to orbital speed, the fourth to attain escape speed, the fifth for lunar landing, and the sixth for lunar escape with a 10,000-pound return vehicle. One representative configuration had an overall height of 320 feet. H. H. Koelle of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency argued that orbital assembly or refueling in orbit (earth orbit rendezvous) was more flexible, more straightforward, and easier than the direct ascent approach. Bruce T. Lundin of the Lewis Research Center felt that refueling in orbit presented formidable problems since handling liquid hydrogen on the ground was still not satisfactory. Lewis was working on handling cryogenic fuels in space.
The Chance Vought Corporation completed a company-funded, independent, classified study on manned lunar landing and return (MALLAR), under the supervision of Thomas E. Dolan. Booster limitations indicated that earth orbit rendezvous would be necessary. A variety of lunar missions were described, including a two-man, 14-day lunar landing and return. This mission called for an entry vehicle of 6,600 pounds, a mission module of 9,000 pounds, and a lunar landing module of 27,000 pounds. It incorporated the idea of lunar orbit rendezvous though not specifically by name.
Thomas E. Dolan of the Chance Vought Corporation prepared a company-funded design study of the lunar orbit rendezvous method for accomplishing the lunar landing mission.
John C. Houbolt of the Langley Research Center presented a paper at the National Aeronautical Meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers in New York City in which the problems of rendezvous in space with the minimum expenditure of fuel were considered. Additional Details: Houbolt paper on rendezvous in space with minimum expenditure of fuel.
A study report was issued by the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory on guidance and control design for a variety of space missions. This report, approved by C. Stark Draper, Director of the Laboratory, showed that a vehicle, manned or unmanned, could have significant onboard navigation and guidance capability.
Robcrt R. Gilruth, Paul E. Purser, James A. Chamberlin, Maxime A. Faget, and H. Kurt Strass of STG met with a group from the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation to discuss advanced spacecraft programs. Grumman had been working on guidance requirements for circumlunar flights under the sponsorship of the Navy and presented Strass with a report of this work.
Representatives of the Langley Research Center briefed members of STG on the lunar orbit method of accomplishing the lunar landing mission.
![]() | Apollo Lunar Module Credit: © Mark Wade. 1,341 bytes. 159 x 121 pixels. |
The Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation began work on a company- funded lunar orbit rendezvous feasibility study.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA's Associate Administrator, requested the Directors of the Office of Launch Vehicle Programs and the Office of Advanced Research Programs to bring together members of their staffs with other persons from NASA Headquarters to assess a wide variety of possible ways of accomplishing the lunar landing mission. This study was to supplement the one being done by the Ad Hoc Task Group for Manned Lunar Landing Study (Fleming Committee) but was to be separate from it. Additional Details: Lundin Committee to assess Lunar landing mission.
Basic concepts of the lunar orbit rendezvous plan were presented to the Lundin Committee by John C. Houbolt of Langley Research Center.
The Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (Golovin Committee) notified the Marshal! Space Flight Center (MSFC), Langley Research Center, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) that the Group was planning to undertake a comparative evaluation of three types of rendezvous operations and direct flight for manned lunar landing. Rendezvous methods were earth orbit, lunar orbit, and lunar surface. MSFC was requested to study earth orbit rendezvous, Langley to study lunar orbit rendezvous, and JPL to study lunar surface rendezvous. The NASA Office of Launch Vehicle Programs would provide similar information on direct ascent. Additional Details: Golovin Committee evaluates three rendezvous methods for manned lunar landing.
In a letter to NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., John C. Houbolt of Langley Research Center presented the lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) plan and outlined certain deficiencies in the national booster and manned rendezvous programs. This letter protested exclusion of the LOR plan from serious consideration by committees responsible for the definition of the national program for lunar exploration.
The Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation developed a detailed, company-funded study on the lunar orbit rendezvous technique: characteristics of the system (relative cost of direct ascent, earth orbit rendezvous, and lunar orbit rendezvous); developmental problems (communications, propulsion); and elements of the system (tracking facilities, etc.). Joseph M. Gavin was appointed in the spring to head the effort, and Robert E. Mullaney was designated program manager.
John C. Houbolt of Langley Research Center and Charles W. Mathews of MSC made a presentation of lunar orbit rendezvous versus earth orbit rendezvous to the Manned Space Flight Management Council.
NASA Headquarters selected the Chance Vought Corporation of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., as a contractor to study spacecraft rendezvous. A primary part of the contract would be a flight simulation study exploring the capability of an astronaut to control an Apollo-type spacecraft.
Members of Langley Research Center briefed representatives of the Chance Vought Corporation of Ling- Temco-Vought, Inc., on the lunar orbit rendezvous method of accomplishing the lunar landing mission. The briefing was made in connection with the study contract on spacecraft rendezvous awarded by NASA Headquarters to Chance Vought on March 1.
MSC Associate Director Walter C. William reported to the Manned Space Flight Management Council that the lack of a decision on the lunar mission mode was causing delays in various areas of the Apollo spacecraft program, especially the requirements for the portions of the spacecraft being furnished by NAA.
A preliminary Statement of Work for a proposed lunar excursion module was completed, although the mission mode had not yet been selected.
MSC invited 11 firms to submit research and development proposals for the lunar excursion module (LEM) for the manned lunar landing mission. The firms were Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, The Boeing Airplane Company, Northrop Corporation, Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, Douglas Aircraft Company, General Dynamics Corporation, Republic Aviation Corporation, Martin- Marietta Company, North American Aviation, Inc., and McDonnell Aircraft Corporation. Additional Details: Invitation to bid for the Apollo lunar excursion module.
![]() | LM Ascent Stage Credit: NASA. 12,324 bytes. 276 x 239 pixels. |
Of the 11 companies invited to bid on the lunar excursion module on July 25, eight planned to respond. NAA had notified MSC that it would not bid on the contract. No information had been received from the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation and it was questionable whether the Northrop Corporation would respond.
The NAA spacecraft Statement of Work was revised to include the requirements for the lunar excursion module (LEM) as well as other modifications. The LEM requirements were identical with those given in the LEM Development Statement of Work of July 24.
The command module (CM) would now be required to provide the crew with a one-day habitable environment and a survival environment for one week after touching down on land or water. In case of a landing at sea, the CM should be able to recover from any attitude and float upright with egress hatches free of water. Additional Details: LEM added to Apollo CSM Statement of Work.
Nine industry proposals for the lunar excursion module were received from The Boeing Company, Douglas Aircraft Company, General Dynamics Corporation, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Martin-Marietta Corporation, Northrop Corporation, and Republic Aviation Corporation. NASA evaluation began the next day. Additional Details: Nine industry proposals for the Apollo lunar excursion module received.
Faced by opposition of mode selection by Jerome Wiesner, Kennedy's science adviser, NASA let contracts to McDonnell and STL for direct two-man flight modes. Both concluded that it was feasible but would require LH2/LOX stages for descent and ascent from lunar surface, which NASA/STG adamantly opposed. This was also the last stab - for the time being - at 'lunar Gemini'.
The Office of Systems under NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight completed a manned lunar landing mode comparison embodying the most recent studies by contractors and NASA Centers. The report was the outgrowth of the decision announced by NASA on July 11 to continue studies on lunar landing modes while basing planning and procurement primarily on the lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) technique. Additional Details: Final manned lunar landing mode report.
NASA announced that the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation had been selected to build the lunar excursion module of the three-man Apollo spacecraft under the direction of MSC. The contract, still to be negotiated, was expected to be worth about $350 million, with estimates as high as $1 billion by the time the project would be completed. Additional Details: Selection of Grumman to build the Apollo lunar excursion module.
NASA Administrator James E. Webb, in a letter to the President, explained the rationale behind the Agency's selection of lunar orbit rendezvous (rather than either direct ascent or earth orbit rendezvous) as the mode for landing Apollo astronauts on the moon. Arguments for and against any of the three modes could have been interminable: "We are dealing with a matter that cannot be conclusively proved before the fact," Webb said. "The decision on the mode . . . had to be made at this time in order to maintain our schedules, which aim at a landing attempt in late 1967."
Grumman and NASA announced the selection of four companies as major LEM subcontractors:
Grumman completed its first "fire-in-the-hole" model test. Even though preliminary data agreed with predicted values, they nonetheless planned to have a support contractor, the Martin Company, verify the findings.
At a mechanical systems meeting at MSC, customer and contractor achieved a preliminary configuration freeze for the LEM. Several features of the design of the two stages were agreed upon:
Grumman reported that it had advised North American's Rocketdyne Division to go ahead with the lunar excursion module descent engine development program. Negotiations were complete and the contract was being prepared for MSC's review and approval. The go-ahead was formally issued on May 2.
![]() | Apollo 16 1/6 G leap - Apollo astronaut demonstrates low lunar gravity. Credit: NASA. 65,210 bytes. 631 x 391 pixels. |
MIT suggested a major redesign of the Apollo guidance computer to make the CM and LEM computers as similar as possible. NASA approved the redesign and the Raytheon Company, subcontractor for the computer, began work.
In its first estimates of reliability for the LEM, Grumman reported a 0.90 probability for mission success and 0.994 for crew safety. (The probabilities required by NASA were 0.984 and 0.9995, respectively.)
Space Technology Laboratories received Grumman's go-ahead to develop the parallel descent engine for the LEM. At the same time, Grumman ordered Bell Aerosystems Company to proceed with the LEM ascent engine. The contracts were estimated at $18,742,820 and $11,205,415, respectively.
Grumman selected Pratt and Whitney to develop fuel cells for the LEM. Current LEM design called for three cells, supplemented by a battery for power during peak consumption beyond what the cells could deliver. Grumman and Pratt and Whitney completed contract negotiations on August 27, and MSC issued a letter go-ahead on September 5. Including fees and royalties, the contract was worth $9.411 million.
Grumman directed the Marquardt Corporation to begin development of the LEM reaction control system thrusters. Negotiations had begun on March 11 on the definitive subcontract, a cost-plus-incentive-fee type with a total estimated cost of $10,871,186.
Grumman authorized Hamilton Standard to begin development of the environmental control system (ECS) for the LEM. The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract was valued at $8,371,465. The parts of the ECS to be supplied by Hamilton Standard were specified by Grumman.
North American asked MSC if Grumman was designing the LEM to have a thrusting capability with the CSM attached and, if not, did NASA intend to require the additional effort by Grumman to provide this capability. North American had been proceeding on the assumption that, should the service propulsion system (SPS) fail during translunar flight, the LEM would make any course corrections needed to ensure a safe return trajectory. Additional Details: Grumman to design the LEM to have a thrusting capability with the Apollo CSM attached.
Grumman built a full-scale cardboard model of the LEM to aid in studying problems of cockpit geometry, specifically the arrangement of display panels. This mockup was reviewed by MSC astronauts and the layout of the cockpit was revised according to some of their suggestions.
Also Grumman reported that a preliminary analysis showed the reaction control system plume heating of the LEM landing gear was not a severe problem. (This difficulty had been greatly alleviated by the change from five to four landing legs on the vehicle.
NASA representatives held a formal review of Grumman's LEM M-1 mockup, a full-scale representation of the LEM's crew compartment. MSC decided that (1) the window shape (triangular) and visibility were satisfactory; (2) a standing position for the crew was approved, although, in general, it was believed that restraints restricted crew mobility; (3) the controllers were positioned too low and lacked suitable arm support for fine control; and (4) crew station arrangement was generally acceptable, although specific details required further study.
OMSF, MSC, and Bellcomm representatives, meeting in Washington, D.C., discussed Apollo mission plans: OMSF introduced a requirement that the first manned flight in the Saturn IB program include a LEM. ASPO had planned this flight as a CSM maximum duration mission only.
Grumman issued a go-ahead to RCA to develop the LEM radar. Negotiations on the $23.461 million cost- plus-fixed-fee contract were completed on December 10. Areas yet to be negotiated between the two companies were LEM communications, inflight test, ground support, and parts of the stabilization and control systems.
![]() | Apollo CSM and LM Credit: © Mark Wade. 6,016 bytes. 491 x 271 pixels. |
The first full-throttle firing of Space Technology Laboratories' LEM descent engine (being developed as a parallel effort to the Rocketdyne engine) was carried out. The test lasted 214 seconds, with chamber pressures from 66.2 to 6.9 newtons per square centimeter (96 to 10 psi). Engine performance was about five percent below the required level.
North American gave a presentation at MSC on the block change concept with emphasis on Block II CSM changes. These were defined as modifications necessary for compatibility with the LEM, structural changes to reduce weight or improve CSM center of gravity, and critical systems changes. (Block I spacecraft would carry no rendezvous and docking equipment and would be earth-orbital only. Block II spacecraft would be flight-ready vehicles with the final design configuration for the lunar missions.)
MSC directed Grumman to stop all work on the LEM Little Joe II program. This action followed the ASPO Manager's decision against a testing program for the LEM comparable to that for the CSM.
ASPO directed Grumman to provide an abort guidance system (AGS) in the LEM using an inertial reference system attached to the structure of the vehicle. Should the spacecraft's navigation and guidance system fail, the crew could use the AGS to effect an abort. Such a device eliminated the need for redundancy in the primary guidance system (and proved to be a lighter and simpler arrangement).
MSC issued Requests for Proposals to more than 50 firms asking for studies and recommendations on how the lunar surface should be explored. Studies should show how lunar surveys could be performed and how points on the lunar surface might be located for future lunar navigation. Maximum use of equipment planned for the LEM and CM was expected. Part of the scientific apparatus aboard the LEM would be selenodetic equipment. The study would not include actual fabrication of hardware but might give estimates of cost and development times.
MSC gave its formal consent to two of Grumman's subcontracts for engines for the LEM: (1) With Bell Aerosystems for the ascent engine ($11,205,416 incentive-fee contract) (2) With Space Technology Laboratories for a descent engine to parallel that being developed by Rocketdyne ($18,742,820 fixed-fee contract).
North American was directed by NASA to study feasibility of using the LEM propulsion system as backup to the SM propulsion system. The most important item in the contractor's analysis was strength of the docking structure and its ability to withstand LEM main-engine and reaction control system thrusting.
OMSF outlined launch vehicle development, spacecraft development, and crew performance demonstration missions, using the Saturn IB and Saturn V:
The first formal inspection and review of the LEM test mockup TM-1 was held at Grumman. TM-1 allowed early assessment of crew mobility, ingress, and egress. It was a full-size representation of crew stations, support and restraint systems, cabin equipment arrangement, lighting, display panels and instrument locations, and hatches. The TM-1 evaluation became the basis for the final LEM mockup, TM-5, from which actual hardware fabrication would be made. Additional Details: Apollo LEM mockup TM-1 inspection and review.
Space Technology Laboratories (STL) began using its new San Juan Capistrano, Calif., test facility to static fire the firm's LEM descent engine. Hereafter, the bulk of STL's development firings were made at this site.
Grumman conducted manned drop tests to determine the LEM crew's ability to land the spacecraft from a standing position. All tests were run with the subject in an unpressurized suit in a "hands off" standing position with no restraint system or arm rests.
![]() | Apolo LM Credit: © Mark Wade. 14,042 bytes. 768 x 540 pixels. |
Representatives from a number of elements within MSC (including systems and structural engineers, advanced systems and rendezvous experts, and two astronauts, Edward H. White II and Elliot M. See, Jr.) discussed the idea of deleting the LEM's front docking capability (an idea spawned by the recent TM-1 mockup review). Rather than nose-to-nose docking, the LEM crew might be able to perform the rendezvous and docking maneuver, docking at the spacecraft's upper (transfer) hatch, by using a window above the LEM commander's head to enable him to see his target. Additional Details: Deletion of the Apollo LEM's front docking capability.
NASA and Grumman representatives discussed a weight reduction program for the LEM. Changes approved at the M-5 mockup review portended an increase in LEM separation weight of from 68 to 453 kg (150 to 1,000 lbs). Both parties agreed to evaluate the alternatives of either resizing the spacecraft or finding ways to lighten it about nine percent, thus keeping the improved LEM within the present control weight.
MSC ordered Grumman to halt work on the LEM test article (LTA) 10. The LTA-10's descent stage would be replaced with one cannibalized from LEM test mockup 5.
Testing of the first flight-weight 15-cell stack of the LEM fuel cell assembly began. Although the voltage was three percent below design, the unit had a 980-watt capability. Earlier, the unit completed 150 hours of operation, and single cell life had reached 662 hours.
NASA anticipated five significant milestones for the LEM during the forthcoming year:
MSC analyzed Grumman's report on their program to resize the LEM. On the basis of this information, ASPO recommended that the propellant tanks be resized for separation and lunar liftoff weights of 14,742 and 4,908 kg (32,500 and 10,820 lbs), respectively. Studies should investigate the feasibility of an optical rendezvous device and the substitution of batteries for fuel cells. And finally, engineering managers from both Grumman and MSC should examine a selected list of weight reduction changes to determine whether they could immediately be implemented.
MSC directed Grummann to provide a LEM abort guidance section (AGS) having
MSC's Guidance and Control Division conducted a pilot simulation study to determine whether a pilot could take over manual control of the LEM between 4,572 and 3,048 m (15,000 and 10,000 ft) above the lunar surface and satisfactorily land the vehicle. Additional Details: Study of manual control of the Apollo LEM.
The Preliminary Design Review of the Block II CM was held at North American's Downey, Calif., plant. Ten working groups evaluated the spacecraft design and resolved numerous minor details. They then reported to a review board of NASA and North American officials. Additional Details: Preliminary Design Review of the Apollo Block II CM.
Grumman and Hamilton Standard were exploring various designs for the extravehicular mobility unit. On the basis of some early conclusions, the MSC Crew Systems Division (CSD) recommended that meteoroid and thermal protection be provided by a single garment. Preliminary hypervelocity tests placed the garment's reliability at 0.999. Each would weigh about 7.7 kg (17 lbs), about 2.3 kg (5 lbs) less than the two-garment design. CSD further recommended that the unit be stored either in the LEM's descent stage or in a jettisonable container in the ascent portion.
Parallel development of the LEM descent engine was halted. Space Technology Laboratories was named the sole contractor; the Rocketdyne contract was canceled. Grumman estimated that the cost of Rocketdyne's program would be about $25 million at termination.
![]() | LM vs LK - US Lunar Module compared to Soviet LK lunar lander Credit: © Mark Wade. 8,634 bytes. 663 x 315 pixels. |
Evaluations of the three-foot probes on the LEM landing gear showed that the task of shutting off the engine prior to actual touchdown was even more difficult than controlling the vehicle's rate of descent. During simulated landings, about 70 percent of the time the spacecraft was less than 0.3 m (1 ft) high when shutdown came; on 20 percent of the runs, the engine was still burning at touchdown. Some change, either in switch location or in procedure, thus appeared necessary to shorten the delay between contact light and engine cutoff (an average of 0.7 sec).
MSC announced a realignment of specialty areas for the 13 astronauts not assigned to forthcoming Gemini missions (GT 3 through 5) or to strictly administrative positions:
Charles A. Bassett - operations handbooks, training, and simulators
Alan L. Bean - recovery systems
Michael Collins - pressure suits and extravehicular activity
David R. Scott - mission planning and guidance and navigation
Clifton C. Williams - range operations, deep space instrumentation, and crew safety.
Donn F. Eisele - CSM and LEM
William A. Anders - environmental control system and radiation and thermal systems
Eugene A. Cernan - boosters, spacecraft propulsion, and the Agena stage
Roger B. Chaffee - communications, flight controls, and docking
R. Walter Cunningham - electrical and sequential systems and non-flight experiments
Russell L. Schweickart - in-flight experiments and future programs.
LEM Test Article 2 was shipped to Marshall Space Flight Center to undergo a series of Saturn booster vibration tests.
MSC decided in favor of an "all-battery" LEM (i.e., batteries rather than fuel cells in both stages of the vehicle) and notified Grumman accordingly. Pratt and Whitney's subcontract for fuel cells would be terminated on April 1; also, Grumman would assume parenthood of GE's contract (originally let by Pratt and Whitney) for the electrical control assembly. Additional Details: All-battery Apollo LEM decision - replaces fuel cells.
Missiles and Rockets reported a statement by Joseph F. Shea, ASPO manager, that MSC had no serious weight problems with the Apollo spacecraft. The current weight, he said, was 454 kg (1,000 lbs) under the 40,823 kg (90,000 lb) goal. Moreover, the increased payload of the Saturn V to 43,091 kg (95,000 lbs) permitted further increases. Shea admitted, however, that the LEM was growing; recent decisions in favor of safety and redundancy could raise the module's weight from 13,381 kg to 14,575 kg (29,500 lbs to 32,000 lbs).
After further design studies following the M-5 mockup review (October 5-8, 1964), Grumman reconfigured the boarding ladder on the forward gear leg of the LEM. The structure was flattened, to fit closer to the strut. Two stirrup-type steps were being added to ease stepping from the top rung to the platform or "porch" in front of the hatch.
Space Technology Laboratories' major problems with the LEM descent engine, Grumman reported, were attaining high performance and good erosion characteristics over the entire throttling range.
Grumman presented to MSC its recommendations for an all-battery electrical power system for the LEM:
The first firing of the LEM ascent engine test rig (HA-3) was successfully conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. A second firing on April 23 lasted 14.45 sec instead of 10 sec as planned. A third firing, lasting 30 sec, completed the test series. A helium pressurization system would be installed before additional testing could begin.
ASPO requested the Apollo Program Director to revise the LEM control weight at translunar injection as follows:
![]() | Lunar Module 3 view Credit: © Mark Wade. 10,188 bytes. 586 x 444 pixels. |
In order to use the LEM as a backup for the service propulsion system (SPS) to abort the mission during the 15-hour period following translunar injection, Grumman informed North American that some redesign of the spacecraft's helium system would likely be required. This information prompted North American designers to undertake their own analysis of the situation. On the basis of their own findings, this latter group disagreed with the LEM manufacturer. Additional Details: Apollo LEM as backup for the service propulsion system.
MSC directed Grumman to implement changes in weights of the LEM:
Total LEM | 14,515 kg (32,000 lbs) |
Ascent stage inert | 2,193 kg (4,835 lbs) |
Descent stage inert | 2,166 kg (4,775 lbs) |
At a third status meeting on LEM-1, Grumman put into effect "Operation Scrape," an effort to lighten that spacecraft by about 57 kg (125 lbs). "Scrape" involved an exchange of parts between LEM-1 and LTA-3. The former vehicle thus would be heavier than the latter; LTA-3, on the other hand, would have the same structural weight as LEMs 2 and forthcoming.
MSC assigned two LEM test articles (numbers 10 and 2, respectively) to the SA-501 and SA-502 missions. Prior to flight, the spacecraft would be refurbished by Grumman, which would require four to five months' work on each vehicle.
An explosion damaged a LEM reaction control system thruster being fired in an up attitude in altitude tests at MSC.
A LEM ascent engine exploded during altitude firings at Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC). In subsequent investigations, Bell Aerosystems researchers concluded that the failure probably resulted from raw propellants being accidentally forced into the engine at the end of the second run, thus damaging the injector. Additional Details: Apollo LEM ascent engine exploded during firings.
Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Apollo Program Director, approved the deletion of the LEM TM-5 from the ground test program. Additional Details: Apollo LEM TM-5 cancelled.
Preliminary results of the "fire-till-touchdown" study by Grumman indicated that this maneuver was not feasible. The engine might be exploded by driving the shock wave into the nozzles. Additional Details: Fire-till-touchdown not feasible for the Apollo LEM.
Grumman was invited to provide NASA with a cost-plus-incentive-fee proposal to provide four LEMs subsequent to LEM-11, with the proposal due at MSC by the close of business on the following day. The proposal should be based on a vehicular configuration similar to LEM-11 in all respects, including supporting activities, contractual provisions, and specifications applicable to LEM-11. The required shipment dates for the four vehicles would be December 13, 1968, February 11, 1969, April 11, 1969, and June 10, 1969, respectively.
The mockup of LM test model No. 3 (TM-3) was shipped by Super Guppy aircraft to Cape Kennedy, on the first trip of the Super Guppy from Grumman, Bethpage, N.Y.
LM test model TM-6 and test article LTA-10 were shipped from Grumman on the Pregnant Guppy aircraft. When the Guppy carrying the LTA-10 stopped at Dover, Del., for refueling, a fire broke out inside the aircraft, but it was discovered in time to prevent damage to the LM test article.
MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Manager Joseph F. Shea reported that LM-1 would no longer be capable of both manned and unmanned flight and that it would be configured and checked out for unmanned flight only. In addition, LM-2 would no longer be capable of completely unmanned flight, but would be configured and checked out for partially manned flights, such as the planned AS-278A mission (with unmanned final depletion burn of the ascent stage) and AS-278B (with all main propulsions unmanned).
MSC Director of Flight Crew Operations Donald K. Slayton pointed out to ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea that LM-to-CSM crew rescue was impossible. Slayton said
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller stated that the February completion of MSFC studies of the Saturn V launch vehicle's payload and structural capability would permit an official revision of the payload from 43,100 kilograms to 44,500 kilograms; the CM weight would be revised from 5,000 to 5,400 kilograms; and the LM from 13,600 to 14,500.
NASA announced it would use the Apollo-Saturn 204 launch vehicle to launch the first lunar module on its unmanned test flight. Since the 204 vehicle was prepared and was not damaged in the Apollo 204 fire in January, it would be used instead of the originally planned AS-206.
A fire broke out in the Bell Aerosystems Test Facility, Wheatfield, N.Y., at 2:30 a.m. April 20. Early analysis indicated the fire was started by overpressurization of the ascent engine's propellant- conditioning system, which caused the system relief valve to dump propellant into an overflow bucket. The bucket in turn overflowed and propellant spilled onto the floor, coming into contact with a highly oxidized steel grating. Contact was believed to have initiated combustion and subsequently an intense, short-duration fire. Additional Details: Fire in the Bell Apollo LM ascent engine test facility.
A board was appointed by MSC White Sands Test Facility Manager Martin L. Raines to determine the cause of a fire that had occurred at Test Stand 403 on July 3. The board was to submit its findings by July 17.
MSC Director of Flight Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., raised questions about lunar module number 2: Would it be possible for LM-2 to be a combined manned and unmanned vehicle; that is, have the capability to make an unmanned burn first and then be manned for additional activities? Would additional batteries in the LM provide greater flexibility for earth-orbital missions? Mission flexibility would be worthwhile only if it allowed deletion of a subsequent mission, at least on paper.
Before fire, planned in-orbit test of LM. CSM-101 would dock with and crew would maneuver together.
ASPO Manager George Low in a letter to Dale Myers of North American Aviation, emphasized that the spacecraft weight situation was the single most serious problem in the entire Apollo program. Additional Details: Apollo spacecraft weight situation serious.
LM-1 (Apollo 5) continued to have serious schedule difficulties. However, all known problems were resolved with the exception of the propulsion system leaks. Leak checks of the ascent stage indicated excessive leaking in the incline oxidizer orifice flange. The spacecraft was approximately 39 days behind the July 18, LM-1 KSC Operations Flow Plan.
MSC proposed to the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight a sequence of missions leading to a lunar landing mission. The sequence included the following basic missions:
Confirming an October 27 telephone conversation, ASPO Manager George M. Low recommended to Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips that the following LM delivery schedule be incorporated into official documentation: LM-2, February 5, 1968; LM-3, April 6, 1968; LM-4, June 6, 1968. Subsequent vehicles would be delivered on two-month centers. The dates had been provided by Grumman during the last Program Management Review.
NASA announced an Apollo mission schedule calling for six flights in 1968 and five in 1969. NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller said the schedule and alternative plans provided a schedule under which a limited number of Apollo command and service modules and lunar landing modules, configured for lunar landing might be launched on test flights toward the moon by the end of the decade. Apollo/uprated Saturn I flights were identified with a 200 series number; Saturn V flights were identified with a 500 series number. Additional Details: Apollo mission schedule for six flights in 1968 and five in 1969.
MSC informed MSFC that it would provide the following payload flight hardware for the AS-503/BP-30 flight test: boilerplate 30 (BP-30, already at MSFC); spacecraft-LM adapter 101 and launch escape system (SLA-101/LES) jettisonable mass simulation; and lunar module test article B (LTA-B, already at MSFC). MSC had no mission requirements but recommended that any restart test requirements for the Saturn S-IVB stage be carried out on this mission to simplify requirements for the first manned Saturn V mission.
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips wrote the manned space flight Centers of Apollo schedule decisions. In a September 20 meeting at MSC to review the Apollo test flight program, MSC had proposed a primary test flight plan including
A LM test failed in the Grumman ascent stage manufacturing plant December 17. A window in LM-5 shattered during its initial cabin pressurization test, designed to pressurize the cabin to 3.9 newtons per square centimeter (5.65 pounds per square inch). Both inner and outer windows and the plexiglass cover of the right-hand window shattered when the pressure reached 3.5 newtons per sq cm (5.1 psi). An MSC LM engineer and Corning Glass Co. engineers were investigating the damage and cause of failure.
The first fire-in-the-hole test was successfully completed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). The vehicle test configuration was that of LM-2 and the test cell pressure immediately before the test was equivalent to a 68,850-meter altitude. All test objectives were satisfied and video tapes of TV monitors were acquired. Test firing duration was 650 milliseconds with zero stage separation.
Bellcomm engineers presented to NASA a proposed plan for lunar exploration during the period from the first lunar landing through the mid-1970s. The proposed program - based upon what the company termed "reasonable" assumptions concerning hardware capabilities, scientific objectives, launch rates, and relationships to other programs - was divided into four distinct phases:
Ascent stage; decayed 1/24/68.
Grumman President L. J. Evans wrote ASPO Manager George M. Low stating his agreement with NASA's decision to forego a second unmanned LM flight using LM-2. (Grumman's new position - the company had earlier strongly urged such a second flight - was reached after discussions with Low and LM Manager G. H. Bolender at the end of January and after flight data was presented at the February 6 meeting of the OMSF Management Council.) Although the decision was not irreversible, being subject to further investigations by both contractor and customer, both sides now were geared for a manned flight on the next LM mission. Additional Details: Decision to forego a second unmanned Apollo LM flight using LM-2.
Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC Director of Flight Operations, expressed concern to ASPO Manager George M. Low over the escalation of E-mission objectives; the flight now loomed as an extremely complex and ambitious mission. The probability of accomplishing all the objectives set forth for the mission, said Kraft, was very low. He did not propose changing the mission plan, however. "If we are fortunate," he said, "then certainly the quickest way to the moon will be achieved." Kraft did suggest caution in setting mission priorities and in "apply(ing) adjectives to the objectives." Additional Details: Concern over escalation of Apollo E-mission objectives.
The Apollo Design Certification Review (DCR) Board convened at MSC to examine LM-3 further for proof of design and development maturity and to assess and certify the design of the LM-3 as flightworthy and safe for manned flight. This Delta review was identified as a requirement at the March 6 LM-3 DCR. The Board concluded at the close of the Delta DCR that LM-3 was safe to fly manned with the completion of open work and action items identified during the review.
ASPO Manager George M. Low initiated a series of actions that led to the eventual decision that AS-503 (Apollo 8) should be a lunar orbital mission. Additional Details: Decision that Apollo 8 should be a lunar orbital mission.
George M. Low, ASPO Manager, set forth the rationale for using LTA-B (as opposed to some other LM test article or even a full-blown LM) as payload ballast on the AS-503 mission. That decision had been a joint one by Headquarters, MSFC, and MSC. Perhaps the chief reason for the decision was Marshall's position that the Saturn V's control system was extremely sensitive to payload weight. Numerous tests had been made for payloads of around 38,555 kilograms but none for those in the 29,435- to 31,750-kilogram range. MSFC had therefore asked that the minimum payload for AS-503 be set at 38,555 kilograms. Additional Details: Decision to use Apollo LTA-B as payload ballast on the AS-503 flight.
The LM ascent engine to be flown in LM-3 and subsequent missions would incorporate the Rocketdyne injector, Apollo Program Director Phillips informed ASPO Manager Low. The engine would be assembled and delivered by Rocketdyne under subcontract to Grumman. Additional Details: Apollo LM ascent engine to use Rocketdyne injector.
The Allison descent-stage propellant tank, being redesigned at Airite Division of Sargent Industries to a "lidless" configuration, blew up during qualification test at Airite. The crew noticed loss of pressure and therefore tightened fittings and repressurized. As the pressure went up, the tank blew into several pieces. Grumman dispatched a team to Airite to determine the cause and the necessary corrective action.
The LM-11 midsection assembly collapsed in the assembly jig during the bulkhead prefitting stage of construction at Grumman. The structure buckled when the bulkheads, which had just been prefitted and drilled, were removed to permit deburring the drilled holes. Jig gates that were supposed to hold up the assembly were not in position, nor was the safety line properly installed. The structure was supported by hand. Damage to the skin of the structure was not severe, although a small radius bend was put in one of the upper skins.
ASPO Manager George M. Low apprised Program Director Samuel C. Phillips of MSC's plans for television cameras aboard remaining Apollo missions. With the exception of spacecraft 104 (scheduled for flight as Apollo 9), television cameras were to be flown in all CMs. Also, cameras would be included in all manned LMs (LM-3 through LM-14).
NASA Hq. released a 12-month forecast of manned space flight missions, reflecting an assessment of launch schedules for planning purposes. Five flights were scheduled for the remainder of 1969:
The possibility of an unmanned LM landing was discussed at NASA Hq. The consensus was that such a landing would be a risky venture. Proposals had been made which included an unmanned LM landing as a prerequisite to a manned landing on the moon. However, the capability to land the LM unmanned did not exist and development of the capability would seriously delay the program.
The additional direct cost to the Apollo research and development program from the January 27, 1967, Apollo 204 fire was estimated at $410 million, principally for spacecraft modifications, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller testified in congressional hearings. The accident delayed the first manned flight of the spacecraft by about 18 months. "During this period, however, there occurred a successful unmanned test of the Lunar Module and two unmanned tests of the Saturn V vehicle."
The first flight-model ALSEP arrived at KSC, where it would undergo software integration tests and be prepared for installation in the LM.
The fifth and final drop test of LM-2 was made on May 7. The first four drop tests had been made to establish the proper functioning of all LM systems after a lunar landing. The fifth test was made to qualify the functioning of the pyrotechnics after landing. On May 8, the final test, physically separating the ascent stage, was conducted.
Studies were being conducted to determine the feasibility of intentionally impacting an S-IVB stage and an empty LM stage on the lunar surface after jettison, to gather geological data and enhance the scientific return of the seismology experiment. Data would be obtained with the ALSEP seismographic equipment placed on the lunar surface during the Apollo 11 or Apollo 12 flight. MSFC and Bellcomm were examining the possibility of the S-IVB jettison; MSC, the LM ascent stage jettison. Intentional impacting of the ascent stage for Apollo 11 was later determined not to be desirable.
Explored lunar surface near LM and deployed EPISEP unmanned scientific station equipment.
Following the decision to implement the Saturn V dry Workshop, LM-2 was the only flight LM article to remain on Earth. Therefore, NASA Hq requested MSC consideration for early disposition of it to the Smithsonian Institution as an artifact of historical interest. Since it was expected that the Smithsonian would exhibit LM-2 as a replica of LM-5, Headquarters also requested that MSC consider refurbishment to provide a more accurate representation of the LM- 5 configuration before its transfer to the Smithsonian.
Explored lunar surface near LM and deployed ALSEP unmanned scientific station equipment.
Threw excess equipment out of LM before lift-off.
NASA issued instructions for deletion of the Apollo 20 mission from the program. MSC was directed to take immediate action to:
Explored lunar surface near LM and deployed ALSEP unmanned scientific station equipment.
Threw excess equipment out of LM before lift-off.
Photographed lunar surface panorama from top hatch of LM.
Explored lunar surface near LM and deployed ALSEP unmanned scientific station equipment.
Threw excess equipment out of LM before lift-off.
Explored lunar surface near LM and deployed ALSEP unmanned scientific station equipment.
Threw excess equipment out of LM before lift-off.
Explored lunar surface near LM and deployed ALSEP unmanned scientific station equipment.
Threw excess equipment out of LM before lift-off.