Nova NASA 7 Solid Mo - Nova NASA 7 Solid Motors Credit: © Mark Wade. 1,608 bytes. 51 x 441 pixels.

Cluster of 7 160 inch solid motors used as first stage; upper stages as Nova 4S and 8L.

LEO Payload: 197,300 kg. to: 160 km Orbit. at: 0.0 degrees. Payload: 75,300 kg. to a: translunar trajectory. Liftoff Thrust: 8,906,450 kgf. Total Mass: 7,492,760 kg. Core Diameter: 11.6 m. Total Length: 123.0 m.

• Stage Number: 1. 7 x 160 inch solid Gross Mass: 907,000 kg. Empty Mass: 91,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 1,406,000 kgf. Isp: 263 sec. Burn time: 150 sec. Isp(sl): 238 sec. Diameter: 4.1 m. Span: 4.1 m. Length: 36.6 m. Propellants: Solid No Engines: 1. 160 inch solid

• Stage Number: 2. 1 x Nova 60-8-2 Gross Mass: 680,000 kg. Empty Mass: 54,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 1,088,000 kgf. Isp: 428 sec. Burn time: 242 sec. Isp(sl): 310 sec. Diameter: 11.6 m. Span: 11.6 m. Length: 35.1 m. Propellants: Lox/LH2 No Engines: 2. M-1

• Stage Number: 3. 1 x Nova 60-8-3 Gross Mass: 227,000 kg. Empty Mass: 23,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 91,000 kgf. Isp: 425 sec. Burn time: 941 sec. Isp(sl): 306 sec. Diameter: 6.7 m. Span: 6.7 m. Length: 30.5 m. Propellants: Lox/LH2 No Engines: 1. J-2

• Saturn C-5 launch vehicle configuration selected

  Rosen Committee studies in November and December indicated that the most flexible choice for Apollo was the Saturn C-4, with two required for the earth orbit rendezvous approach or one for the lunar orbit rendezvous mission, with a smaller landed payload. The panel rejected solid motors again, but Rosen himself still pushed for Nova. An extra F-1 engine was 'slid in' for insurance, resulting in the Saturn C-5 configuration. The Manned Space Flight Management Council decided at its first meeting that the Saturn C-5 launch vehicle would have a first stage configuration of five F-1 engines and a second stage configuration of five J-2 engines. The third stage would be the S-IVB with one J-2 engine. It recommended that the contractor for stage integration of the Saturn C-1 be Chrysler Corporation and that the contractor for stage integration of the Saturn C-5 be The Boeing Company. Contractor work on the Saturn C-5 should proceed immediately to provide a complete design study and a detailed development plan before letting final contracts and assigning large numbers of contractor personnel to Marshall Space Flight Center or Michoud.

• Manned Space Flight Management Council meeting

  The preparation of schedules based on the NASA Fiscal Year 1962 budget (including the proposed supplemental appropriation), the Fiscal Year 1963 budget as submitted to Congress, and Fiscal Year 1964 and subsequent funding was discussed at the Manned Space Flight Management Council meeting. Program assumptions as presented by Wernher von Braun, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), were approved for use in preparation of the schedules :

  • The Saturn C-5 launch vehicle and earth orbital rendezvous were considered the primary mode for the lunar landing.
  • Full-scale orbit operations development, including ground testing, would be accomplished, using S-I boosters and orbital upper stages. This development would be planned so that upper stages and rendezvous techniques would be developed by the time the C-5 was operational. Planning would consider both connecting and fueling modes.
  • The development of a two-stage Nova with liquid-propellant engines in both stages would be activated as early as realistically feasible. This would provide an alternative, direct flight mode carrying the same orbital launch vehicle as developed for the C-5.
  • There would be no solid-propellant vehicle development.
  Charles W. Frick of MSC and Hans H. Maus of MSFC would coordinate schedule assumptions between the Centers.

• Conclusions on the selection of a lunar mission mode based on studies conducted in 1961 and 1962 Spacecraft: Apollo LM.

  The Office of Systems under NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight summarized its conclusions on the selection of a lunar mission mode based on NASA and industry studies conducted in 1961 and 1962:

  • There were no significant technical problems which would preclude the acceptance of any of the modes, if sufficient time and money were available. (The modes considered were the C-5 direct ascent, C-5 earth orbit rendezvous (EOR), C-5 lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR), Nova direct ascent, and solid-fuel Nova direct ascent.)
  • The C-5 direct ascent technique was characterized by high development risk and the least flexibility for further development.
  • The C-5 EOR mode had the lowest probability of mission success and the greatest development complexity.
  • The Nova direct ascent method would require the development of larger launch vehicles than the C-5. However, it would be the least complex from an operational and subsystem standpoint and had greater crew safety and initial mission capabilities than did LOR.
  • The solid-fuel Nova direct flight mode would necessitate a launch vehicle development parallel to the C-5. Such a development could not be financed under current budget allotments.
  • Only the LOR and EOR modes would make full use of the development of the C-5 launch vehicle and the command and service modules. Based on technical considerations, the LOR mode was distinctly preferable.
  • The Directors of MSC and Marshall Space Flight Center had both expressed strong preference for the LOR mode.
  On the basis of these conclusions, the LOR mode was recommended as most suitable for the manned lunar landing mission. (The studies summarized in this document were used by the Manned Space Flight Management Council in their mission mode decision on June 22.)

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  Nova Concepts - NASA Credit: © Mark Wade. 13,422 bytes. 640 x 349 pixels.

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• 215 - Scala, Keith J, and Swanson, Glen E, Quest, "They Might Be Giants Part 1", Fall, 1992.