I belong to a generation that developed a special dislike for any public activity. Compulsory participation in communist events created a sort of protective reaction: we attended the meetings and conferences but at the same time we invented a lot of tricks for non-participation--a kind of passive protest.

With Gorbachev's perestroika our passivity came to an end. At one and the same time in all big cities of the USSR appeared the so-called political discussion clubs. Before taking part in any events we wanted to understand: what was the nature of the society we had been living in? We found the answers, and they scared not only the young club members but the authorities as well. In Kirghizia it was like anywhere else: party officials tried to ban unauthorized activities. But it was too late. Popular fronts and big democratic movements emerged in 1989-90 in all republics (except Turkmenistan). In Kyrgyzstan the Democratic Movement (DM) was created in spring 1990, and it was immediately involved in settling the most alarming ethnic conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in Osh. Communist authorities proved to be quite useless in settling this conflict, while the new DM leaders managed to find the right words and convince people to stop the bloodshed.

But the powers didn't want to take any responsibility. Moreover, they tried to use this conflict as an excuse to stop all democratic changes. Their reasons were notoriously familiar: our people were not ready for democracy. And again DM took the initiative: political protest actions finally resulted in the election of our current president of Kyrkyzstan, Askar Akaev, instead of a reactionary communist leader.

It was the peak of achievement for the Democratic Movement. Lack of experience, lack of constructive programs and the political ambitions of leaders eventually plit it into two parties. Now, looking back to that period, we understand that popular fronts and movements are not best suited to carrying out reforms but to destroying a system which proved to be unchangeable by slow progress.

After gaining its independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan was swept (like other republics of the FSU) by waves of national feelings. The parties that appeared were mostly mononational (monoethnic). They proclaimed as their objective the rapid creation of a nationalistic state with a monoethnic population, one state language, and the termination of all links with the "Empire." But Kyrgyzstan is only 52 percent Kyrgyz and has about 80 other nationalities and ethnic groups, so this goal was very hard to achieve. The response followed very soon: about 18 national centers were created. Some of them were concerned with preserving national culture, ethnic peculiarities, minorities' rights. Others (like the Slavic, Jewish and German associations) turned into a sort of emigration agencies.

Fortunately, the period of nationalist renaissance ended quite peacefully, though Kyrgyzstan lost about 500,000 of its inhabitants in 1989-1994 as a result of migration. But now the emigration stream has subsided considerably, and it is reported that about 30 percent of our emigrants have returned to Kyrgyzstan--which Kyrgyz authorities have officially proclaimed a Homeland for everyone, irrespective of national, social, or religious background.

Now we have 12 political parties, and they all took part in the first multiparty elections to the Parliament (February 1995). At least 5 parties were more or less successful in their struggle for mandates. But it should be noted that the electorate voted on the grounds of individuality rather than party programs. The existing clan structure in rural regions also contributed to non-party preferences. This can be ascribed to the fact that political parties are not mature enough, and a very small percent of the population is engaged in party activities. The fact that even the most popular leaders were nominated as candidates of the remote villages where they were born [instead of as candidates of a party] is another proof of the electorate's immaturity.

The latest elections also showed the lack of analytical approach in the party bodies. The number of nominees exceeded the real capacity to support them. Another serious problem of the electoral process was the interference by local administrations that was noted by observers in most regions. In Issyk-Kul Oblast the pressure went beyond any limits: threatening of candidates, interference with the work of polling sites and district commissions, orders to limit access to the media (except for favored candidates), etc. These conflicts resulted either in the postponement of some of the elections or their declaration as invalid.

The law requires active involvement by local officials in order to "make necessary provisions for fair and democratic elections." But some provisions of Article 22 of the electoral law do not clearly define what is interference and what is assistance to electoral commissions on the part of government bodies.

After the first and second rounds, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) was actually buried under an avalanche of complaints. The numerous minor violations and several serious cases were, however, approached differently by the CEC. This fact, in its turn, caused another wave of complaints. The practice of recounting ballots resulted in releasing quite new figures after the publication of preliminary results.

That's why our first multi-party elections proved to be a mess.

The public frustration over parties and their activities does not imply total passivity or aversion to politics: 465 NGOs were registered by the end of 1994. Such statistics don't say anything, however, about their effectiveness, and there are several problems which can reduce the contribution of the NGO sector to public life.

There exist three main problems in the relations between grassroots organizations and the authorities:

1. a lack of professional skills--on both sides,

2. a lack of sincerity--on both sides, and

3. a strong desire to monopolize the activities--on both sides.

Kyrgyz-American Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law
Natalia Ablova, Director
Marina Adamovskaya, Program Officer
175 Sovetskaya St.
720011 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Phone: (3312) 26 57 54
Fax: (3312) 26 38 65
E-mail: ma@rights.bishkek.su

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The URL for this page is: http://solar.rtd.utk.edu/~ccsi/csew/95-03/kyrgngos.htm
Last updated: March 28 1996

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